It is an understatement to say that The Gambia needs a better political culture and political leadership that is clean, competent, pragmatic, accountable, and committed to integrity and zero tolerance for corruption, underpinned by capable civil service and strong institutions. From my perspective, the lowering of the threshold for what is required to lead a country has seemingly caused a crowding of the political theatre with many actors some of whose commitment and capacity to lead the country are far from convincing. There are many political parties, movements, and alliances of parties: some formally registered, others seeking registration, others seemingly operating around existing political structures or positioning themselves to attract the attention of established parties. And still, some yet to show their heads, and others might as well be on the red carpet, alongside models and so-called social media influencers. Increasingly, the political theatre seems less than serious, resembling a comedy house, raising the fundamental question: are we serious- that is are we genuinely building a stronger democratic opposition, creating more vehicles for political ambition, or simply multiplying the sources of political acrimony? To elaborate on the latter: what obtains at present is a political landscape in which serious campaigning on substantive policies is a rare commodity; instead, political parties and movements seem preoccupied with pageantry and hurling vitriol at one another, while the country is sliding towards a failed state.
Worryingly, instead of campaigning on policy issues, I found that a particular language is increasingly making the rounds in Gambian political discourse: “I/we have invested a lot….” What exactly does this mean? Political parties are not supposed to be private investment entities, and political participation should not be reduced to a claim of financial investment. So, the use of word “invest” by political actors, either directly or indirectly, and its apparent endorsement by the movement or party leader, seems to suggest to me that some politicians view the money, time or political capital they spend building a movement or party as an investment. If so, are they suggesting that they are entitled to a return? If so, what does the size of that return look like? From my perspective, failing to be clear with the electorate on such issues is deceitful. Unfortunately, it seems to me that our journalists often do a poor job of interviewing these political actors. They seem to not yet master the art of listening carefully, probing assertions and asking the necessary follow-up questions. Good interviewing is not about getting through a list of questions. It is about asking, listening and following the answer with other questions; the interviewee’s answers should reveal something to the listeners- take the listeners somewhere.
There is also an uncomfortable criticism that must be directed at the electorate. In too many instances, political support has become transactional: if your party or movement want people to attend their meeting, you must pay. For example, if you want to hold a meeting in Sika or Jarra Barrow Kunda, it is not enough to provide food and water; you pay for the firewood to cook the food and provide transport to bring supporters to the meeting and back. This culture of pay-to-participate politics is not merely expensive; it distorts political engagement and support, encourages dependency, reducing citizenship to a transaction in which votes, attendance and loyalty are treated as commodities. To my mind, voters, especially Gambian voters, can be unpredictable: they seem to accept a free T-shirt, follow the sound of the music and just as readily accept a free ride to see the rest of the country, but locking their endorsement can be difficult; crowd sizes never seem to translate into votes.
Citizens should be wary whenever political service is (seemingly) presented primarily as an investment, with a presumption of expected return. Public office is supposed to be a responsibility, a sense of duty, not a commercial venture or transaction. Perhaps one reason our politics repeatedly disappoints is that we tolerate, and sometimes even reward politicians who treat political organisations and public institutions as instruments for personal advancement. We are good at complaining about the quality of our political leadership while repeatedly accepting politics as an enterprise. And with so many parties and movements, this seems truer now than ever before. So, we get, in large measure, the politics we tolerate and perhaps deserve. I understand if it seems unfair to say that we get what we deserve, but it seems to me a reasonable position to take when one considers why we continue to struggle to choose between the good, the bad, and the ugly. Perhaps, ultimately, we are simply not very good at reading the room.
The proliferation of opposition parties or movements presents The Gambia with a particularly serious problem. If the opposition remains fragmented among numerous parties, movements and personalities, it is entirely possible that no single opposition force can command sufficient electoral strength to defeat the incumbent. Therefore, fragmentation can become an unintended advantage for Barrow. It seems obvious to me that if the objective is genuinely to defeat Barrow in the December 2026 presidential election, political commitment, political maturity and political pragmatism must enter the conversation of alliance or coalition building. All serious opposition actors must make choices that are (personally) uncomfortable and politically inconvenient. They may have to work with people they (probably) do not like; set aside longstanding grievances; accept that their preferred party or movement, personality, structure or manifesto cannot be the centre of every negotiation or political arrangement. I do not consider this a surrender, but an important exercise in coalition or alliance politics in which compromise and accommodation are necessary in the national interest. In the Gambian context, it may be unrealistic to expect a supply and demand kind of coalition building exercise. For clarity, the strategic question- for the sake of country- should be: realistically, can any one opposition force defeat a determined incumbent if it refuses to cooperate with other opposition forces simply because of disagreements over personalities, history or organisational ownership? Opposition parties or movements must recognise that Barrow is always prepared to work with any opposition party or movement if that increases his chances of remaining in power. To emphasise, he seems to understand the law of addition more than the opposition: he seems to know more than the opposition that strength comes from numbers and that, politically, cooperation is more powerful than division. Indeed, that is the formula that ended Jammeh’s rule.
Some may hold the view that sidelining a major political party could, under certain circumstances, be strategically useful. Others may read the room differently: that an alliance, merger, coalition (or call it what you like) of smaller or newer forces could attract voters who are tired of the established parties. However, I think it may help if any proposed strategy is judged by the answer to this simple question: does an arrangement, cooperation, coalition or alliance increase or decrease the probability of defeating the incumbent? History: parties or movements that develop an inflated sense of the size of their following may do so at their own peril.
If saving the country from ineffective leadership and consequently preventing the country from further sliding towards state failure is genuinely the overriding objective for competing for political office, then opposition politicians must be prepared to distinguish between what they want for the country and what sincere political manoeuvres they must make to realise a more effective alliance or coalition. To achieve this, I think they may have to learn the art of holding their noses; they may have to compromise; they may even have to negotiate with people with whom they fundamentally disagree, but do so for the country, not for themselves. However, if the primary motivation for opposition parties or movements coming together is what each party or movement expects to receive in return, e.g., cabinet positions, influence or other political rewards or appointments, then if the partnership wins, we are looking at a bloated and costly government- potentially no different to what obtains now. Such an alliance or coalition may, after the election, face serious challenges and prove fragile. It is also important to note here that the political system in The Gambia places considerable power in the hands of the president. This bit may sound familiar: a president who enters office on the basis of a coalition agreement may temporarily satisfy the various demands but subsequently dismiss members of the coalition. Such manoeuvres, while politically significant, do not necessarily threaten the survival of the government, no matter how hopeless or clueless the government is. In our system, the president can replace ministers and officials, often with relative ease. It is one of the weaknesses of political system; too much depends on the individual occupying the public house on 1 Marina Parade.
However, in more institutionally mature democracies, reshuffling, departure or sacking of some key figures can fundamentally alter the direction or stability of a government because political parties, parliaments, other institutions, and individuals possess greater independent authority and integrity. In our system, political loyalty seems remarkably transactional; the president has many people waiting for an opportunity to enter government.
Therefore, the opposition should be thinking of campaigning on policies and winning and what they can do beyond the 2026 election. Coalition or alliance agreements require careful consideration and public scrutiny. A successful alliance or coalition cannot simply be an electoral arrangement designed to defeat one individual. It must be an agreement about how the country will be governed, how institutions will be reformed, strengthened; how presidential power will be constrained, and to prepare for how political parties/movements will behave when/if they disagree. In my view, opposition parties and movements face a historic choice. They and their supporters can continue fighting among themselves and competing for ownership of the opposition space, arguing over who has invested more, whose party is bigger or draws the largest crowds, and whose leader deserves greater recognition and being the leader/flag bearer because of their sacrifices. Or they can recognise that none of them, acting alone, may be capable of delivering the political change they claim to seek.
I believe the responsible course is neither to abandon pragmatism nor to compromise on principle. However, it is to develop and sustain a clear understanding of the seriousness of our political dilemma and to keep that firmly at the forefront of our minds. We must ask which principles are worth defending at all costs, which compromises are absolutely necessary, and which personal ambitions must be subordinated to the national interest. If opposition leaders genuinely believe that the country needs a different direction of travel- I think most serious minds can agree on this-, they should prove it to the electorate by their willingness to form a grand alliance or coalition based on a programme for governing rather than a bargain over political spoils. Alliance or coalition building requires coming to the negotiating table and respecting the outcome of due democratic processes.
Ultimately, Gambians must also accept some responsibility. We cannot keep electing politicians on the basis of personality, short-term interests, empty promises, and then act surprised when the political system produces disappointing outcomes- utterly hopeless leaders. Therefore, the challenge before the opposition is not simply how to defeat a determined incumbent who seems to understand the law of addition more than the opposition. If opposition forces are to demonstrate that they understand the price of disunity, they must work to build a broad coalition or alliance capable of replacing the current political culture and system, which are unfit to govern the country. Time will tell if the opposition parties or movements can pass this real test.
